Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Some aspects of the navigation period extension in the North-West Basin of inland waterways of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation has a developed system of inland waterways (IWW) [1]. This system consists of 15 basins. Winter conditions are very harsh in some basins. Such basins, for example, include the Lena Basin. But in some basins, even in winter, conditions that block navigation do not form. These basins include the Volga-Baltic. However, during the extension of the navigation period in such basins, it should be borne in mind that the navigation safety system will have to be upgraded. This paper discusses some aspects, the introduction of which forms the prerequisites for extension of the navigation period on the waterways of the North-Western region of the Russian Federation. In addition, specific recommendations are provided for the implementation of the necessary automated systems to ensure a sufficient level of navigation in winter conditions on the IWW. These recommendations were obtained within the framework of the international project INFUTURE

Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks

Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigated transmission of fiber optical elements, which are commonly used in QKD systems for designing countermeasures against Trojan-horse attacks, in 1500-2100 nm range. As a result, we found loopholes in their transmission spectra which open possibilities for eavesdropping. We also suggested a simple passive countermeasure based on violation of total internal reflection in single-mode fiber, that leads to additional insertion losses of at least 60 dB for double-pass Trojan-horse probe pulses for wavelengths longer than 1830 nm.Comment: 10 pages, 12 figure

The Rationale for the Optimal Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

This article describes the current technical level of developments in the field of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD). Various classifications are described, the criteria are analyzed, and the optimal protocol is selected. The analysis is focused around device-dependent schemes with a theoretical emphasis, and therefore, a detailed analysis of device-independent CV-QKD and side-channel attacks is out of the scope of the work. However, the latter, one way or another, is taken into account when describing possible classifications. The choice of the optimal protocol was carried out, first of all, from the potential possibility of integration into existing network telecommunication infrastructures. Predominantly, the general classification is carried out in such a way that it is possible to draw up a specific protocol, depending on the task of implementation